

20 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : PFIAB, the Navy, Et Al

1. I attended a meeting of a special panel of PFIAB today to discuss various matters of naval interest. The special panel, chaired by Admiral Anderson (and including Gordon Gray, Bob Galvan and Wheaton Byers), has been looking into "the navy problem." The stimulus is the President's statement to Admiral Anderson on 4 October that he wants to insure that the US navy is "second to none."

2. This was the third of the panel's intensive sessions to date. DIA and NSA were also represented at today's meeting, topic of which was Naval Command and Control--Ours and Theirs. Essentially, though, the sessions have been navy shows with little input from others.

3. Admiral Zumwalt attended part of the session today. One of the senior attendees was VAdm Jerry King, J-3 of JCS. Admirals Rectanus and Harlfinger were among the briefers.

4. Among matters raised were several of interest to you:

25X1

plan. There were also comments about the intelligence community's penchant for mis-estimating in crisis times. Gordon Gray cited the problem of "subjective judgements in crisis times" as the biggest we have. Admiral King agreed, saying that strategic warning is an acute problem and operators have concluded they cannot rely on receiving it.

c. Admiral Zumwalt was critical of the pattern of annual estimates of force levels. He claimed that hindsight studies showed that the community historically underestimated them. He added that intelligence forecasting of technical advances was particularly weak.

d. The PFIAB panel was intrigued by description of Soviet leader participation in defense exercises as a means of practicing command and control. Admiral Anderson asked about US experience in this regard and was told that it has been traditionally impossible to get National Command Authority (i.e., the President and SecDef) participation in exercises-- and even if it were, said King, the mere movement of our leaders in time of crisis to a mobile command post would provoke an enemy and scare our people.


e. In this context, Anderson asked how often DCIs have met with the JCS. He said he thought it most important you do so regularly. King said you have postponed some scheduled meetings in which the JCS have wanted to brief you on "certain strategic matters."

f. Anderson said at one point that he knew there was general agreement over the "weaknesses" of the Board of National Estimates and that NIO's, "under George Carver," were to replace the board.


SECRET

He referred to the practice of having "mature, professional" military men and diplomats on the board and wondered if the new system might be lacking in something. No specific answer was given, several of us noting that the NIO system is just beginning and describing your hopes and expectations in this regard. Anderson seems particularly concerned about applying "mature, professional" knowledge in times of crisis.

25X1

  
E. H. KNOCHE  
Director  
Strategic Research

cc: DDCI  
D/DCI/NIO  
D/DCI/IC  
DDI



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

November 8, 1973

Dear Bill:

The intelligence estimative process has been the subject of informal PFIAB recommendations in the past and has been a continuing personal concern of mine. I was therefore delighted to have George Carver come in yesterday morning to discuss the NIO concept. I believe this concept, as George describes it, should give you the response flexibility you seek and enable you to provide effective intelligence support without being impeded by a bureaucratic structure which does not neatly support a particular issue at hand.

The above notwithstanding, the NIO's are institutional creatures and subject to institutional bias. George was careful to point out that he intends making extensive use of outside consultants in formulating national intelligence estimates, and the elimination of the "consensus" is an excellent move. I am, nonetheless, concerned that in eliminating the "board of wise men" concept, you have also diminished the wisdom factor.

I urged George that you consider the appointment of three or four senior men from outside of Government with diverse backgrounds and experience who could serve the checks-and-balances function for the institutional product. These men would be responsible only to you and ideally, at some future date, might also serve as additional contacts with the highest policy levels of our Government. If I can be of assistance, please let me know.

With kindest regards.

*\* as very senior retired military/foreign  
service officers*

Sincerely,

George W. Anderson, Jr.  
Admiral, USN (Ret.)  
Chairman

The Hon. William E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

DCI/P/DCI

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000300110023-7

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	IG		
2	DDCI			12	D/PPB		
3	DDS&T			13	SAVA		
4	DDI			14	ASST/DCI		
5	DDO			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC			17			
8	D/ONE ✓			18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Interesting idea -  
a sort of DCI level  
PFIA B perhaps -  
We might think of  
some names -

*[Signature]*

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000300110023-7

DCI/DCI

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 6 Nov 73

TO: Mr. Wheaton Byers  
Executive Secretary  
FROM: President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board  
SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Per our 5 November telephone conversation, attached are four documents: the two memoranda on the NIO's which have been sent to USIB principals and the two internal Agency notices. As you will note, what you basically have are two documents, each sent out in two different formats.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

C  
U  
R  
R  
E  
N  
T  
  
I  
N  
F  
O  
R  
M  
A  
T  
I  
O  
N